Inspire 6: Operational Methods Changes

Inspire vol 6 came out yesterday and for the most part, it was more of the same ol same ol. Long diatribes on AQ doctrine, the usual shahidi laments and exhortations, a bomb making cook recipe for Acetone Peroxide (I can see more than a few jihobbyist fingers getting taken off accidentally) and then the little section below screen captured titled “Jihadi Experiences”

Jihadi Experiences:

After OBL was sent to his pineapple under the sea, I had written a post titled “Al Qaeda: The Case of A More Diffuse and Autonomous Organisation” in which I made the observation that AQ might be re-thinking its C&C structure as well as its organizational groups. This part of the Inspire magazine is saying that very thing.

• Point one on the list is the fact that they need to re-tool their operations to have more diffused and compartmented cells. They want to have cells that operate in a way that if one of their members gets caught, they will not know the whole picture and be able to give away the rest of the team.

• Point two notes that they need younger recruits but those recruits seem to not want to commit themselves fully to the cause. They are observing that perhaps they could get the youth involved by contributions but not having them commit fully. This seems to be the essence of the jihobbyist to me. Looks like they want to use this.

• Point three re-iterates the need for more diffused, mobile, and agile units because the battle space is not longer driven by discreet front lines.

• Point four makes a key statement that the drone strikes are causing problems for them and backs up point three in that wherever they are meeting or hiding, even underground, we are using technology to find them and strike them.

The summation though from these points is rather telling however;

• Firstly, they have renamed jihad to “resistance” its a bit more Western friendly term for those jihobbyists who do not speak Arabi well and it is a paradigm change. You are fighting a battle of resistance against the oppressor instead of being mandated by Allah and the Koran to do so. It goes to the whole idea of using the youth as a movement without the absolute commitment to Jihad.

• The second statement re-iterates the need for a new youth movement that will ease them all into the ideology of jihad. Once again, using the key word of “resistance”

• The third and fourth statements have key changes but ones that has been building. They are aiming for more lone wolf jihadi acts. They say this though, with the intent of directing those lone wolves to key targets. I believe that they want to deploy the command and control over the propaganda wing’s postings online. This would make sense, just dangle targets out there and exhort the ‘youth ummah’ to go forth and commit jihad.

• The fifth statement concerns their ongoing efforts online to spread jihadi ‘sciences’ as well as political doctrine. Of late, the forums have been under attack by differing factions. Mostly though, the actors taking down the sites seem to be non state actors (patriot hackers) egged on by the recent spate of Anonymous hacks and attacks. However, there have been other issues the jihobbyists have been facing. Their Facebook jihad has been failing because Facebook keeps taking their pages down. It has been suggested that they create front pages with links to harder content that is hidden to prevent this. All of this though is tempered with the fact that they do not want to be caught, like said Anonymous actors who lately have been scooped up by the authorities.

• Statements six and seven are interesting. They speak of creating cells of resistance and re-naming them systems of action “Nizam Al-Amal” and not as secret organizations for action “Tandim Lil-Amal” Once again, the movement is looking to have secure cells that will have a C&C but not so much that if any of their members are caught, the cell will not be taken down nor will that effect the upper echelons security.

This section of the magazine is the most interesting to me. It shows just how much harder is has become for the jihad to function with our intelligence apparatus and drone strikes going on. Obviously AQAP has been feeling the bite of counterintelligence operations as well as counter insurgency efforts. The problems they face though are pretty tough. Just how do you go on to inspire the ummah with no way to really have a command and control apparatus to guide them?

Even with all the subtle changes to language here (neuro-linguistic programming) I don’t see that any organization like theirs can have what they seek. After all, the basic premise that AQ and other radical orgs have used to to indoctrinate the youth in places like the madrassa’s of Afghanistan. They only teach them the Koran and they only teach them barely what they need to function, all the while controlling very carefully, the youth’s doctrinal belief. Without this, and seeking a Western cache of jihadi troops to fill their ranks, they are seeking a new way not only to bring them to the ‘resistance’ but also to control them.

Guess what AQ, it will fail. No matter what method you finally try to use.

Look at this from the anonymous perspective of command and control. They claim to be headless but in fact they have always had an underlying structure. There will always be need for command and control over any operational force that goes into battle.

And with that C&C structure, there will always be a method to get inside it and tear it apart…  As the Anonykids are discovering now (see yesterday’s arrests of 14 more anons)

So, we can see that AQAP is grappling with the issue and perhaps their base is eroding even further. I am glad to see that they are having problems and trying to work them out in a public forum for me to watch. I am sure others in the community are as well…

Keep giving us all your ideas AQAP. The more you give, the sooner we will have you all wrapped up.

K.