(Greek: κρυπτεία / krupteía, from κρυπτός / kruptós, “hidden, secret things”)

WannaCrypt0r Roundup

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So last weekend and this week have been fun times in INFOSEC am I right or am I right? When Wannacry started making the rounds on Twitter I knew pretty much then and there I just likely lost my weekend to the derp of yet another ransomware distro. Luckily for me though, I forced my org to “do the things” on patching etc where the Shadowbrokers dump was concerned. So at the end of the day we came through the weekend unscathed by WannaCry yay me! However, in looking at the Twitter feed and Hyrbid/VT pages I began to worry that soon enough this malware would come at us all not just by worming through the net but also from phish waves. Today was the first day I have seen someone trying to at least possibly send a phish wave using a popped box in Egypt with the WannaCry.exe for download so hang on kids, you may well be seeing this as well and if you have not patched your shit and have old 2003/Xp your days may get to be like the end times that others around the globe have had since last Friday.

In the meantime though, I began looking at all the malware C2’s and exploits and notice a couple things. First off I kept seeing two IP addresses tied to the IPC$ in the binary/memory of the malware. I began to look for these addresses and while I surmised the 192.168 address was a off the shelf home router, the other maybe was something else. After some searches I came to the conclusion that this was another non routable address but that it may belong to an org or another off the shelf router of some kind.

With a little more looking I had thought that I had come up with the answer. It was some default IP scheme for a GSM gateway or some internal network somewhere in the world like China (found an F-5 with that scheme) but then I hit upon one last hit that suddenly appeared from a blog post by ZeroSum0X0. The post on Github was 6 days ago and that places it before the malware started to make the rounds. One day before the malware started burning through NHS I think if the reports are right from the news. Now this really has piqued my interest because if this IP and system belong to the blog poster or who they work with, then maybe the exploit was cribbed by the malware cabal to use EternalBlue. The poster (ZeroSum) seems to work for Rapid7 and Rapid7 was working on deploying the code for EternalBlue for Metasploit.

I reached out to ZeroSum on Twitter but nothing back so far. Coincidentally the code for the EternalBlue exploit was deployed this afternoon (as of this writing about an hour ago) to Metasploit. Now, the question I have is about this IP/System call that is in all the malware out there. Was this IP/system in the original binary that was pulled apart by ZeroSum from EternalBlue or was this an internal system that was being used to make the code work in some way? That it is directly in the post and that is a day before the great conflagration, I have to wonder. I would love for someone at R7 or Zero to let me know what the deal is with this. I mean, did someone steal the exploit code from you guys and deploy it after you got it working or, was this in the binary already? This is kind of a keystone to many questions concerning who may have created and deployed this malware as I see it.

The argument goes like this….

  1. The WannaCry campaign was carried out by criminals looking to score big money
  2. The WannaCry campaign was carried out by nation state actors (Lazarus Group/DPRK? Russia?)
  • Well, if it was just a criminal gang then did they reverse the binary and make this thing work? If they did then is that an internal IP that they used and forgot to sanitize from the code?
  • Well, if the nation state actors who potentially stole the exploits in the first place had to steal the actual working exploit from R7 then just how good are these guys anyway? It seems that there have been some other mistakes in coding as well that lead to snafoo’s with the bitcoin wallets as well so…

You see where I am going with this right?

Now, I had said from the beginning that this attack did not feel like it was about the money and the low numbers in the wallets kind of bears that out in my mind. However, there are some inconsistencies here and that IP/System in there makes me wonder some more especially when I see the same string in the code tied to R7’s work that was released today. If the code did in fact get cribbed from ZeroSum and by proxy R7 that does not bode well in the PR department for companies that do this kind of work (metasploit etc pentest tool vendors and creators) does it? It is kind of akin to leaving that hand grenade in front of the toddler right?

So, if R7/ZeroSum could respond to this little factoid it would be great. All of this also may bear some significance on the attempts at attribution that are flying about the news and Twittersphere right now where this attack is concerned. Frankly this all could have been much much worse had the coders thought to make domains that could not possibly be on the internet as kill switches. Kinda like this one I think (see below) that has been making the rounds in Hybrid and VT.

No kill switch and no way to sinkhole it would be a lot more devastating right? Of course the whole thing about the killswitch being there in the first place has a lot of people wondering. Then, there is the whole shadowbrokers foolery with the post last night they made. They are now claiming to have much more and will parse it all out in coming months…

Interesting times…

Ok.. Off to the deck for sun.



Well, I made some connections and had a chance to DM with someone from R7. For the record ZeroSum does not work for R7 he works for another company but is a contributor to Metasploit. R7 as of yesterday was trying to get a hold of ZeroSum to ask how that IP with IPC$ got in there and where it came from in the first place. As of this writing I have not heard back from them.

Tuesday when I posted this I connected with ZeroSum and he said someone else would email me….

I have no email.

In the interim the page that I located the IPC$ code snippet is no longer there. The page has been redacted. It also turns out that Malware Unicorn made a comment about the malware seeming to have been using Metasploit framework code for deployment of the exploit (DoublePulsar) and has since redacted that page as well…

Screenshot from 2017-05-18 16-00-52

So here’s my thing… Was the code snippet taken before the malware was launched and kluged into the wannacry malware to make it work? Was that code taken from the Zerosum git page on the day before or before that and then implemented by the wannacry authors? This would seem to be something logical given the hints I have seen with regard to that IPC$ and non route-able IP address. Was this an IP inside the networks where this code was being tested and perfected?

In essence, did someone fuck up and place code on the net for research that in turn was used by the adversaries to make Wannacry work and launch it into the wild?

I ask this because of the time table here and the events since that lead me to believe this is the case. I cannot say for sure because no one has given me any information to counter this belief. No one is saying much of anything other than R7 saying they are looking into it (which I know they are in reality) so I believe them.

So, it’s either this code and the telemetry from it were in an original sample of the malware that maybe ZeroSum had BEFORE the outbreak and was reversing to use to make the git posts and get the metasploit deployment working or this code maybe was cribbed by the malware creators and used to global effect.

Which is it?

Of course all of this also paints a new picture on attribution right? If LAZARUS is the culprit (a theory I do not ascribe to) then why  would they hang around this git to grab code? These guys should have had the time to fully reverse this stuff and make it workable for them. It is my opinion either there is EPIC obfuscation going on here to make it look as though it is LAZARUS or that LAZARUS is deliberately trying to look inept and throw investigators off the trail. This information though, if true and can be verified might lead to some more breadcrumbs.

I look forward to some more light on this.


UPDATE II: Response from RiskSense


The Metasploit module for the EternalBlue vulnerability was developed by community contributors, zerosum0x0 and JennaMagius, security researchers at RiskSense, a provider of pro-active cyber risk management solutions. The module was developed to enable security professionals to test their organization’s vulnerability and susceptibility to attack via EternalBlue. As part of their research, the researchers created a recording of the network traffic that occurs when the Fuzzbunch EternalBlue exploit is run. The purpose of this recording was to help educate other security professionals, and get feedback as they worked through the process. This kind of approach is fairly common in both the security researcher and open source contributor communities, where transparent collaboration enables individuals to pool their expertise and achieve greater results. It’s possible that data from this analysis was copied and rewritten by individuals with malicious intent; we cannot confirm if this is the case or not. Unfortunately, this is a risk that is taken whenever technical information and techniques are shared publicly. None-the-less, we believe the educational and collaborative benefits generally outweigh the risk. To our knowledge, no code from the Metasploit module was ever used in the WannaCry attacks, and once Krypt3ia’s blog pointed out the possibility that some of the information may have been used by the attackers, we removed the video from the Github repository to ensure no other bad actors would be able to do likewise to create variants of the malware.

Here’s a summary of context and the technical details:

–          On April 27th, JennaMagius created a recording of the network traffic that occurs when the Fuzzbunch EternalBlue exploit is run. That recording was subsequently posted at The recording included an IP that was used as a lab target of the original exploits.

–          Recording the replay and playing it back works against freshly booted boxes because the Tree Connect AndX response will assign TreeID 2048 on the first few connections, after which it will move on to other tree IDs. This is the same for the user login request. The replay would then fail because the rest of the replay is using “2048” for the tree and user IDs, and the server has no idea what the client is talking about.

–          On April 30th, JennaMagius published a script that slightly enhanced that replay by substituting in the server provided TreeIDs and UserIDs. This code was subsequently posted at

–          Zerosum0x0x’s research supplemented these findings by outlining that __USERID__PLACEHOLDER__ and __TREEID__PLACEHOLDER__ strings were also present in the malware.

Replaying ANY recording of EternalBlue will produce the same result, so the attackers may have chosen to use that particular recording to throw investigators off track. It is important to note that to our knowledge no code from the Metasploit module was ever used in the WannaCry attacks.

To be successful, the attackers independently implemented sending the network traffic in C; constructed additional code to interact with DoublePulsar (which is a significantly harder undertaking than just replaying the recorded traffic), implemented the rest of their malware (maybe before or after), and then released it on the world.


Written by Krypt3ia

2017/05/16 at 18:23

Posted in Malware

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