Archive for the ‘The Short Con’ Category
Let’s File This Under: No Shit Sherlock
Internet-based attempts to steal U.S. military technology via defense contractors are on the rise, according to an annual Department of Defense analysis of data supplied by the defense industry.
Not only are network probes and intrusions on the increase, the Department of Defense said in the report, which it released late last month, but so are “bold and overt” requests for information made via e-mail and even social networks.
Information systems are the most-heavily targeted of military technologies, according to the report, closely followed by aeronautics. Efforts to get details on unmanned aerial vehicle technology are becoming so widespread that the report broke out a separate section about UAVs, finding that, there, too, foreign elements are looking for information on UAV IT systems.
Full Article HERE:
Yet again, this is not news per se.. This has been going on for some time at the defense contractors as well as other places of business. The Chinese are very adept at this.. Well sometimes not so “adpet” as much as persistent. Often they will send people on “knowledge exchanges” to get data from companies by simply asking for it nicely.
Often that is all it takes much to the chagrin of the companies that have been thieved from by such exploits. The new twist though has been the use of the social networking angle. Of course the APT is agile enough to figure out that this is a great way to socially engineer what they want from some shmuck online. Whats more, many of these companies may in fact NOT have any rules on their employees use of social media at the office, never mind any guidance of what not to publish personally about work.
Know what it’s gonna take to prevent this stuff?
Education of users!
GAH! I SAID IT!
Many are loathe to hear such things… But, that’s the key kids. I was thinking about it this morning as I listened to NPR’s second installment on cyberwar. Many of the problems we face today in the private sector where cyberwar is concerned stem from user issues as well as uneducated management. The combination of the two can be a potent recipe for major PWN.
When management doesn’t get security, and does not teach or mandate security principles for the EU’s, then you have a complete FAIL on security measures. So much so that in some cases I have been party to, servers are placed into environments un-patched and effectively pre-pwn3d by lack of due diligence and due care to secure them.
Suffice to say that in some cases these low end social engineering attacks are the least of their worries… But they trundle on developing more insecure homegrown apps and buying every COTS package that promises to secure the shit out of them but in reality does little to protect them. Without education of the users and management, you have a null sum game.
Anyway, back to the Chinese… Yes, they have been calling/emailing/Friend-ing for a while now to use the OSINT/Social Engineering/ Pretexting exploits that work ever so well on an innocently slumbering nation.
It’s not new. It’s just the news du jour… How about some education huh?
CoB
Two Dimensional Thinking on APT Matters
by Richard Bejtlich at Taosecurity
I expect many readers will recognize the image at left as representing part of the final space battle in Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan. During this battle, Kirk and Spock realize Khan’s tactics are limited. Khan is treating the battle like it is occuring on the open seas, not in space. Spock says:
He is intelligent, but not experienced. His pattern indicates two-dimensional thinking.
I though this quote could describe many of the advanced persistent threat critics, particularly those who claim “it’s just espionage” or “there’s nothing new about this.” Consider this one last argument to change your mind. (Ha, like that will happen. For everyone else, this is how I arrive at my conclusions.)
I think the problem is APT critics are thinking in one or two dimensions at most, when really this issue has at least five. When you only consider one or two dimensions, of course the problem looks like nothing new. When you take a more complete look, it’s new.
- Offender. We know who the attacker is, and like many of you, I know this is not their first activity against foreign targets. I visited the country as an active duty Air Force intelligence officer in 1999. I got all the briefings, etc. etc. This is not the first time I’ve seen network activity from them. Wonderful
- Defender. We know the offender has targeted national governments and militaries, like any nation-state might. What’s different about APT is the breadth of their target base. Some criticize the Mandiant report for saying:The APT isn’t just a government problem; it isn’t just a defense contractor problem. The APT is everyone’s problem. No target is too small, or too obscure, or too well-defended. No organization is too large, two well-known, or too vulnerable. It’s not spy-versus-spy espionage. It’s spy-versus-everyone.The phrasing here may be misleading (i.e., APT is not attacking my dry cleaner) but the point is valid. Looking over the APT target list, the victims cover a broad sweep of organizations. This is certainly new.
- Means. Let’s talk espionage for a moment. Not everyone has the means to be a spy. You probably heard how effective the idiots who tried bugging Senator Landrieu’s office were. With computer network exploitation (at the very least), those with sufficient knowledge and connectivity can operate at nearly the same level as a professional spy. You don’t have to spend nearly as much time teaching tradecraft for CNE, compared to spycraft. You can often hire someone with private experience as a red teamer/pen tester and then just introduce them to your SOPs. Try hiring someone who has privately learned national-level spycraft.
- Motive. Besides “offender,” this is the second of the two dimensions that APT critics tend to fixate upon. Yes, bad people have tried to spy on other people for thousands of years. However, in some respects even this is new, because the offender has his hands in so many aspects of the victim’s centers of power. APT doesn’t only want military secrets; it wants diplomatic, AND economic, AND cultural, AND…
- Opportunity. Connectivity creates opportunity in the digital realm. Again, contrast the digital world with the analog world of espionage. It takes a decent amount of work to prepare, insert, handle, and remove human spies. The digital equivalent is unfortunately still trivial in comparison.
To summarize, I think a lot of APT critics are focused on offender and motive, and ignore defender, means, and opportunity. When you expand beyond two-dimensional thinking, you’ll see that APT is indeed new, without even considering technical aspects.
Actually, I disagree with Richard in a few ways. Mostly though, I think that the idea of the APT attacks on anything other than just military contractors as being new is a fallacy. This is especially true when you take into account the latest reports on the oil companies being hacked into years ago and only now being reported on or found.
You see you have to look at the “Thousand Grains of Sand” approach that China has taken and see it for what it is. This is not just military because “everything” affects everything else and the Chinese see this. After all, they invented “Go” So they think much more than two dimensionally from the start.
So, the reality is that this is not new. It’s only new to the masses because the mainstream media has picked up on this as well as the government and private companies.
Now, lets twist this another way.
Not only China has these capabilities. How about the avowed interest of Russia post Putin’s speech that pretty much outlines a program like that the PRC has. Surely too you cannot count the Israeli’s out of this game as they really were the biggest industrial espionage group for a while back in the 80’s. Of course they were using more HUMINT than anything else back then, but the paradigms change don’t they? You evolve to survive.
I respect Richard quite a bit, but here we differ. I am one of those saying that this is nothing new. I see it all over the news and hear it in the halls of power now post Google.
“OMG OMG OMG what will we do?”
How about this. We shore up our defenses by making smart choices in the personal and private spaces on information security. We teach our people more about the “loose lips sink ships” mentality from WWII and make them aware of their responsibilities.
Most of this attack happened through Facebook and social engineering exploits teamed up with good digital surveillance and data-mining. The social behaviors of individuals led to the clicking of the links or the lowering of defenses that allowed these attacks to occur.
We need to change the way we think in American business. The military already gets it with OPSEC etc, but that is a foreign word to most people in the work force at the fortune 500. The same rules apply but the playing field has changed and that is all.
We used to tell people to watch for folks without badges, some place still do. We try to educate them to not let people piggyback through the front door. It still happens. We lecture on physical security issues but human nature is strong and we generally want to be helpful. It is in this trait we fail in security awareness.
So, nowadays its not so much meeting someone at a bar and getting into trouble with a swallow. It’s
“Hey I’m your friend! Add me!” Or “Hey, I need that password again can you txt it to me?”
After that the “asset” is no longer needed. That is the paradigm change and no, its not so new.
What can we do? How about we start with some real rules on infosec for the masses. We already have SOX, how about we actually have some real audits with real implications on failure? Whatever happened to HIPAA? It still has no tooth and every day it seems I am seeing more stories on lost patient or user data? Wouldn’t a little hard drive encryption go along way? Or maybe some more tutorials on how NOT to lose your laptop in the back of a car.. In the open.
It’s simply this. Until we change the way we think and act, this type of attack will be used against us and succeed.
CoB
Art Imitating Movies?
Leonardo Notarbartolo strolls into the prison visiting room trailing a guard as if the guy were his personal assistant. The other convicts in this eastern Belgian prison turn to look. Notarbartolo nods and smiles faintly, the laugh lines crinkling around his blue eyes. Though he’s an inmate and wears the requisite white prisoner jacket, Notarbartolo radiates a sunny Italian charm. A silver Rolex peeks out from under his cuff, and a vertical strip of white soul patch drops down from his lower lip like an exclamation mark.
In February 2003, Notarbartolo was arrested for heading a ring of Italian thieves. They were accused of breaking into a vault two floors beneath the Antwerp Diamond Center and making off with at least $100 million worth of loose diamonds, gold, jewelry, and other spoils. The vault was thought to be impenetrable. It was protected by 10 layers of security, including infrared heat detectors, Doppler radar, a magnetic field, a seismic sensor, and a lock with 100 million possible combinations. The robbery was called the heist of the century, and even now the police can’t explain exactly how it was done.
The loot was never found, but based on circumstantial evidence, Notarbartolo was sentenced to 10 years. He has always denied having anything to do with the crime and has refused to discuss his case with journalists, preferring to remain silent for the past six years.
Until now.
The rest HERE
Wired has just published a story on the web that it plans on publishing in their next paper edition on the “Antwerp Diamond Heist” of 2003. I write the title of “Art Imitating Movies” because this story reads much like the script for a “heist” film on par with The “Oceans” series of movies or “The Italian Job” *side note, I am listening to both scores as I read and write about this article**
This heist story brings in all the big plot lines that these films usually have. A group of con artists, technicians, and thugs, an impenitrable vault, and an elusive and as yet un-named mastermind with the funds and the connections to make it happen. Hell, they even had a scale model of the vault just like the movies!
The question is though; “Do we believe this story at all, in part or just a little?”
I for one believe the technical details as they can be seen in the crime scene photos as well as the police reports. Such things as how they defeated the light/heat sensor in the vault with a can of hair spray is a classic hack that has been done. Or perhaps the use of the polystyrene shield to prevent the heat sensor on the exterior from going off by “The Genius”
The working out of the code by watching a video taken by secreted cameras is a bit harder to conceive working, but, it could be done. Even the bypass of the internal electrical pulse and the electromagnetic plates was sheer simple genius that obviously the designers never thought low tech enough to discover their weakness.
Classic.. and well done gentlemen.
Now, how the story played out by the tale told by Leonardo Notabartolo has some interesting twists. The real truth of what happened to the “merch” may never be down. Diamonds are all too easy to traffic, cut, sell, disperse, that they are likely already in your friend “Tom’s” diamond engagement ring he got over at the mall for all we know.
The idea that these guys were played and played so handily really is the thing that trips alarms for me. The article contends that the face man (Notarbartolo), a known Mafia connected guy, who had been a thief since 8 years old, could be so easily duped just doesn’t play. Leonardo’s been around the block, he is no fool, but you are supposed to believe that he would go into a gig like this so trusting of his benefactor/facilitator?
I agree though, what a short con this would make! Imagine carrying off a con where you pocket 100 million in diamonds all the while you have used a talented crew of thieves to do your dirty work. Staggering really, yet so so elegant in play. This too also implies a very large conspiracy by the merchants at that facility. All of them would have to be on board for this to work. Keeping all their diamonds in their personal vaults, somehow shifting them to secure locations instead of being in the vault. Of course they have dirty dealings on a daily basis there no? Not inconceivable.
Overall, this story I think has yet to really play out. How it wil I cannot say…What can I say though… I admire their escapade.. Well sans the pound me in the ass prison part.