INFOPOCALYPSE: You Can Lead The World To The Security Trough.. But You Can’t Make Them Think.

“Dark, profound it was, and cloudy, so that though I fixed my sight on the bottom I did not discern anything there”

(Dante Alighieri; The Inferno)

The current state of the Security “Industry”

It seems that once again people who I have acquaintance with in the security industry are wondering just how to interface with corporations and governments in order to build a base of comprehension about the need for information security. The problems though are myriad with these questions and the task to reach people can be a daunting one, never mind when you have groups of them in hierarchies that comprise some of the worst group think in the world (AKA corporations)

Added issues for the “industry” also surround the fact that it is one at all. Once something moves from an avocation to a profession, you have the high chance of it becoming industrialised. By saying something has been made industrialised, implies to many, the cookie cutter Henry Ford model really. In the security world, we have seen this from the perspective of magic boxes that promise to negate security vulnerabilities as well as teams of consultants who will “securitize” the company that is hiring them with magic tools and wizardry. The net effect here is that those paying for and buying into such products and services may as well be buying a handful of magic beans instead.

Now, not every company will be efficacious in their assessments nor live up to the promises they make for their hardware/software solutions. Many practitioners out there and companies really try to do the right thing and do so pretty well. However, just as in any other business, there are charlatans and a wide range of skilled and unskilled plying their arts as well. Frankly, all that can be said on this issue is “Caveat Emptor”  It’s a crap shoot really when it comes to goods and services for security solutions. The key is though, to be able to secure yourselves as a company/entity from the standpoint of BASIC security tenets up.

Often its the simple things that allow for complete compromise.. Not just some exotic 0day.

So we have a cacophony of companies out there vying for people’s dollars as well as a news cycle filled with FUD that, in some cases are directly lifted from the white papers or interviews with key players from those said same companies seeking dollars. It is all this white noise that some now, are lamenting and wondering just how do we reign things in and get a stable base to work from in an ethical way to protect companies and individuals from information security meltdowns. More so it seems lately, the question has been how do we reach these people in the first place? How do we actually get a meaningful dialogue with the corporate masters and have them come away with the fundamentals of security as being “important”

Unfortunately, I think that there are some major psychological and sociological hurdles to overcome to reach that point where we can evince the response we all would like to see out of those C level execs. I have written about them before, but I will touch on them again later in this piece. Suffice to say, we all have a tough row to hoe where this is concerned, so, I expect there to be no easy answer… Nor really, any satisfactory conclusions either.

“It is a tale Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, Signifying nothing”

(Shakespeare; MacBeth)

Security Joan of Arc’s and their Security Crusade:

Joan De Arc was a woman ahead of her time. She wore men’s clothing and lead the French in battle against the English and to victory, all as a teen girl. She later was burned at the steak for heresy and just recently made a saint many years later. I give you this little history lesson (link included) to give you an idea of who you all are in the security industry lamenting over not being listened to. You too may be ahead of your time, but, just as she was, you too will not be listened to because your ideas (to the listeners) are “radical”

Now, radical is a term I am using to denote how the corporate types are seeing it. We, the security advocates, do not see these concepts as radical, but instead as common everyday things that should be practices (complex passwords, patching effectively, etc) They (the client) see these things as impediments to their daily lives, their bottom lines, and their agenda’s both personal and corporate. There are many players here, and all of them have agenda’s of their own. This is a truism that you must accept and understand before you rail against the system that is not listening to your advice.

Here’s a bit of a secret for you.. The more ardent you seem, the more likely you will be branded a “Joan” The perception will be that you are a heretic and should not be listened to. Instead you should be marginalised in favour of the status quo.. After all, they have gone about their business every day for years and they are just fine! The more you rail, or warn with dire tones, the more you will be placed at the back of the mind.

Think Richard Clarke (I heard that chuckle out there)

Though Joan inspired the French forces to battle on and win more than a few battles, she eventually was burned at the steak. Much of this was because of her unique nature and fervour. Much as yours may do the same to you… Without of course literally being burned at the steak and you all must learn this. I think you have to take a page from the hackers playbook really and use the axiom of being a “Ninja”

The subtle knife wins the battle.

 

“If the Apocalypse comes, beep me”

(Joss Whedon;Buffy the Vampire Slayer)

What’s the worst that could happen really?

The quote above really made me chuckle in thinking about this article and the problems surrounding the premise. This I think, is the epitome of some people’s attitudes on security. Most folks just go along their days oblivious to the basic security measures that we would like them to practice as security evangelists. The simple fact is that like other apocalypse scenarios, people just have not lived through them and been affected by them to change their behaviours accordingly. What solidified this for me recently was the snow storm last October here in New England that caught so many people flat footed. They simply had not ever really had to rely on their wits and whatever they had on hand before like this. When the government and the corporations (CL&P) failed to provide their services to the populace, the populace began to freak out.

Its the same thing for information security. Whether it is the government or the corporations that supply us all, both are comprised of people who all pretty much lack this perspective of being without, or having really bad things happen to them. 9/11 comes the closest, but, that only affected NYC and DC directly (i.e. explosions and nightmarish scenarios with high casualties) In the case of corporations, you have lawyers and layers of people to blame, so really, what are the risk evaluations here when it is easy to deflect blame or responsibility? For that matter, it was inconceivable to many in the government (lookin at you Condi) that terrorists would use planes as missiles… Even though a month before a report was handed out with that very scenario on the cover.

The core of the idea is this. Human nature on average, and a certain kind of psychology (normative) that says “This can’t happen to us” We all have it, just some of us are forward thinking and see the potentials. Those forward thinkers are likely security conscious and willing to go out of their way to carry out actions to insure their security. Things like storing extra food and water as well as other things that they might need in case of emergency. These can be life of death deal breakers.. Not so much for information security at your local Acme Widget Corp. In the corporate model, they have the luxury of “It’s somebody else’s problem” So, these things are usually not too important to them unless that person making the decision is cognisant of the issues AND responsible for them. Unfortunately, as we have learned these last 10 years or so, responsibility is not their strong suit.

So, on they go.. About their business after you, the security curmudgeon has told them that they need to store food for the winter..

But the grasshoppers, they don’t listen… Until they are at your door in the snow begging for food.

 

“More has been screwed up on the battlefield and misunderstood in the Pentagon because of a lack of understanding of the English language than any other single factor.“

(John W. Vessey, Jr.)

How do we communicate and manipulate our elephants?

Back to the issue of how to communicate the things we feel important. This has been a huge issue for the security community for a couple of reasons.

1. The whole Joan of Arc thing above
2. The languages we speak are.. Well.. like Tamarian and theirs are corporate speak.

We, the security practitioners, often speak in metaphor and exotic language to the average corporate manager. You have all seen it before, when their eyes glaze over and they are elsewhere. We can go on and on about technical issues but we never really seem to get them to that trough in the title. Sometimes you can get them to the trough easily enough by hacking them (pentesting) but then they think;

“Well this guy is a hacker… No one else could do this! What are the chances this is going to really happen? Naaahhh forget it, it’s not likely”

So there is a bias already against doing the things that we recommend. Then comes the money, the time, and the pain points of having to practice due diligence. This is where they turn off completely and the rubric of it is that unless they are FORCED to carry out due diligence by law or mandate, they won’t. We all have seen it.. Admit it.. It’s human nature to be lazy about things and it is also human nature to not conceive that the bad things could happen to them, so it would be best to prepare and fight against them.

So, how do we communicate with these people and get them on the same page?

I have no answers save this;

“Some get it.. Some don’t”

That’s the crux.. You have to accept that you as the security practitioner will NEVER reach everyone. Some will just say thank you and good day… And you have to accept that and walk away. As long as you have performed the due diligence and told them of their problems.. You have done all you can. You can try and persuade or cajole them… But, in the end, only those who get it or have been burned before will actually listen and act on the recommendations you make.

“The greater our knowledge increases the more our ignorance unfolds”

(John F. Kennedy)

The Eternal Struggle

There you have it. This will always be the case and it will always be the one thing that others seeking to compromise corporations and governments will rely on. The foolishness of those who do not plan ahead will be their undoing..

Eventually.

All you can do sage security wonk, is calmly and professionally explain to them the issues and leave it to them to drink.

K.

The Son of Stuxnet… Methinks The Cart Be Before Ye Horse

My dear dear lord,
The purest treasure mortal times afford
Is spotless reputation—that away,
Men are but gilded loam, or painted clay.
A jewel in a ten-times barr’d-up chest
Is a bold spirit in a loyal breast.

Mowbray, Richard II Act 1 Scene 1

 

 

As fate would have it, today I saw a tweet that said Symantec had a paper coming out on “Stuxnet II” I surfed on over and read the document and what I was left with was this;

“We rushed to judgement here and wanted to get this out to get attention before anyone else did.. Here’s STUXNET REDUX!”

Now, sure, the code base appears to be Stuxnet’s and yes, there are similarities because of this, however, calling this Stuxnet Redux or “Son of Stuxnet” is just a way of patently seeking attention through tabloid style assumptions put on the Internet. Let me pick this apart a bit and you decide…

Code Bases and Re-Tasking

So ok, the coders seemed to have access to the FULL source of Stuxnet. It has been out there a while and surely some people in the world of “APT” have had access to this. It’s not like it was some modified version of Ebola kept at Sverdlosk at Biopreparate. Had you even considered that it was released on purpose as chaff to get others to tinker with it and thus middy the waters?

I’m guessing not from the report that I read, hurried as it was and full of conclusions being jumped to. In fact, Symantec even said that they had not fully audited the code! C’mon…

Alrighty then, we have a newly released and re-tasked version of Stuxnet that turns out to be just a recon tool to steal data. I find it interesting that they make so much of this and intone that the coders of the original are up to shenanigans again but fail to even beg the question that it could be anyone with the requisite skills to cut into the original code (after it had been laid out for everyone to look at) and re-task it with a new time frame. Please note that there are not the original 0day attacks and multiplicity factors of infection vectors as well as exfiltration schemes.

So, not really so complicated as I see it.. You?

The original code/malware was very targeted and this, well this is really just like any other APT attack that I have seen out there.. In fact, in some ways its less clever than the APT attacks out there from the past.

So, really Symantec, take a step back and mull this all over again before you release.. Say.. Just who else had the code and you were worried about that would steal your thunder here?

Pathetic.

RATS, RECON, & Targets

Speaking of the infiltration/ex-filtration picture, I see from the report that they are linking the RAT to the original worm but have not real proof that it came from DUQU! It was found in situ on the box that they analyzed and make the assumed statement that it was “likely” downloaded by the malware via its comms to the C&C.

Once again I say “Evidence Much?”

You have no basis other than assumption but you make no real clarification on this. Though there is mention of a DQ.tmp file which I assume means that it came from the RAT.. But.. Proof again please? It’s the little things that count here and I see a great failure in your haste Symantec.

Another thing that is bugging me now is that the news cycle is making connections to DUQU with attacks on power grids.

HOLY WTF?

Symantec, DO YOU HAVE EVIDENCE of what companies were “Targeted” by this malware re-hash? If so, you should come out of the closet here a bit because this is BS unless you have proof. I of course understand that you cannot name the companies, but CONFIRM OR DENY that they were all Power companies before making claims and allusions that the media will just shriek at the top of their lungs placing more FUD on the headlines.

Or… Wait.. Now that might be an advantage to you guys huh?

Ponder.. Ponder…Ponder…

Well played….

What it all boils down to for me is this:

Someone re-tasked the malware and stuck a common RAT in it. Until you (Symantec) come up with more solid evidence of more interesting and technical attacks, then I call bullshit on you.

What? No Mention Of APT Here?

Meanwhile, I see that people are assiduously avoiding the APT word… Hmmmm What does this attack really remind one of… APT!

There, I said it.

APT attacks:

• Infiltrate
• Seek data
• Exfiltrate data
• Keep access

And therein lies the rub. DUQU has a 36 day shelf life. Now, this is good from a foot-printing level AND could be excellent for setting up the next attack vector that could include the component of sustained access. So, the reality here for me is that this was a foot print attempt on whatever companies it was set upon. It was a recon mission and that was all.

NOT STUXNET..NOT SON OF STUXNET!

Had you called it a Stuxnet like attack re-purposing code then I would have had less problems with your document Symantec. Instead we got FUD in a hurry.

Baseless Claims: Pictures Or It Never Happened!

Finally, I would like to see Symantec spend some more time here as well as see others pull this all apart. I want to see more proof before you all go off half cocked and get the straights all upset over an attack that may have nothing to do with the original.

Frankly, I find your faith in rationality disturbing… Symantec…

K.

Anonymous, SCADA, LULZ, DHS, and Motivations

Anonymous Is Interested In PLC’s & SCADA?

A recent .pdf bulletin put out by Homeland Security (i.e. DHS) claims that certain actors within Anonymous (and by that they mean “anonymous”, I added the distinction) have shown interest in at least Siemens SIMATIC PLC’s and how to locate them online for exploitation. It seems that DHS though warning about this threat, is not too concerned about its actually being exploited by the group because they lack the expertise to attack them. So, why the BOLO on this at all? If the collective cannot do the damage to the infrastructure that you are entrusted in keeping safe, then why report on it at all as credible intelligence? It would seem to some, myself included, that Anonymous is not the problem that they are really worried about on the macro scale, but instead, those who may claim to be Anonymous hitting small scale facilities or pockets of targets for their own purposes.

And therein lies the difference.

If indeed Anonymous the collective is looking at attacking SCADA, one has to wonder at their reasons to target such systems. After all, if Anonymous takes out the power or poisons the water, it will not look good for them PR wise. In fact, were such things to happen in the name of Anonymous, I can pretty much guarantee you all that they would be enemy #1 pretty darned quick post an attack. However, if they were to target a company such as a car maker that pollutes, then, you have a real agenda (per their social agenda of late) So, the targeting is really key here and I will cover that later on.

DHS Jumping The Shark?

The motivations of the release by DHS have also  been called into question by some as to why they chose to talk about this at all. This is especially prescient since they take pains to say that the Anonymous movement “most likely” does not have the technical means and motive to really pull of these types of attacks on the infrastructure. So why even bother? Perhaps they are just covering their bases (or asses) just in case the Anon’s actually attack? Or perhaps, they too are clued in on the fact that even if claimed to be anonymous, it could be others working against the US (Nation State Actors) who have chosen to attack and use Anonymous as a cover so as to throw off attribution.

Either way, as some look at it, it is almost like they are daring Anonymous to do it out of spite because they are calling Anonymous’  factions and actors “inept” or “unskilled” which, might get their dander up a bit. All of these scenarios pretty much do not preclude someone hitting SCADA systems in the future and it being blamed on Anonymous, which will bring on a new wave of efforts by the government to stamp them out. Reciprocity being what it is, this too will mean that Anonymous might in fact gain strength and sympathy from such actions and fallout as well.

For me though, I just see DHS covering the bases so as to not be blamed later on should something happen. Not so much am I of the opinion that they are in some kind of propaganda war here with this little missive.

Motives, Means, Technical Abilities

So lets go with the theory that certain elements of the Anonymous collective want to mess with the infrastructure. Who would they target and why? More to the point, what companies would they target that fits their agenda?

• Telco?
• Power?
• Manufacturing?

Those are the three areas that I could see as potential attack vectors. Though, once again I have to say that the only two that I see as real possible would be the telco and manufacturing and even the telco would be dangerous for them to try as well. I mean, if you start messing with Ebay or Paypal that’s one thing, its quite another to mess with national infrastructure, as these two would be considered. If indeed Anonymous hit them and took them down for whatever reason, they would then be directly considered terrorists… And that would be seriously bad for their movement and its legitimacy.

Now, we do know that the  Anon’s hit the BART system but as I remember it, it was BART that took out the communications infrastructure themselves so as to prevent communication between anon’s. So, this just doesn’t seem to fit for me either. Manufacturing though, as I made the case above, could be something they would try. It’s not national infrastructure and it will not take the country down if they stop something like cars  being made.

Is it just me? Or does anyone else just see this as a non starter for Anonymous central? What I do see is the threat of other actors using the nomme de guerre of Anonymous as cover for their actions to mess with the national infrastructure. Perhaps some of these people might in fact be motivated by anonymous, but, my guess that if there were to happen, it would be nation state driven… And something I have been warning about for some time.

Anonymous, as an idea, as a movement, will be subverted by those looking to fulfil their own ends and justify their means. All the while, they will let the Anon’s take the fall for it.

Governments

Nations

Nation States

… AND.. Corporations.

You know, those with the money and the people who could pull off the technical hacks required to carry these capers off.. Not a bunch of rag tag hacktivists and hangers on.

Blowback

In the end, what I fear is that there will be a great deal of blowback on Anonymous even talking about hacking and messing with infrastructure. The same can be said for their attempts on taking down Wall Street or the NYSE with their DD0S. If they had succeeded, they would have been an annoyance really, but that would not have caused any great fluctuation in the markets I think. No, unless they hacked into NYSE itself and exposed the fact that they had root in there, I think that it would have a very minimal effect on Wall Street and the economy at large.

Not to say that everything is going ever so well now…

DHS seems to have jumped the shark a bit for me on their BOLO and the coverage of this just tends to add to the FUD concerning SCADA and PLC code. Hell, for that matter we have the new Symantec report on DUQU that yells out about it being the “Son of Stuxnet” but in reality, it is more like a clone of Stuxnet used for APT style attacks by persons uknown..

Get yer FUD here!

Same goes for this DHS warning.

Your results may vary…

K.

STUXNET-APOCALYPSE! Say’s the Israeli Who Doesn’t Have Nuclear Silo’s and Bombs….

From Infosec Island

Tomer Teller, a security evangelist for Check Point, warned of the likelihood that the Stuxnet virus could be adapted to undermine systems that control nuclear missile arsenals.

Teller made the prediction at a conference in Sydney, Australia last week hosted by Check Point.

“Nuclear warheads are controlled by computers so if someone managed to slip a worm inside a facility that will reach the warhead component, they could launch it and than aim it back at the country’s facility… Stuxnet is the first cyber weapon that could cause major disruption” Teller explained.

Teller indicated he has conducted a detailed analysis of the Stuxnet code, and given the size and complexity of the file, Teller believes it is likely that a successful attack would require utilization of an insider.

“This is a huge file, it’s 1 megabyte [MB] of code and I respect the skill required to engineer that code as it is very complex,” Teller said.

The most likely avenue of for the attack, Teller postulated, would be through the use of a tainted USB drive.

“In order to get something trusted by Microsoft, you need to get those exploits signed… What we think happened is that an insider broke into JMicron, a chip manufacturing company based in Taiwan, as there is a computer at that office which is dedicated to signing these Microsoft drivers,” Teller said.

My first reaction to this posting online came when I saw it on Greg Evans website where he had scraped the story from another source (never mind why I was there) Since then, this story ended up on the headlines section of Infosec Island and once again my reaction is HOLY WTF? How does this get into the news cycle at all without people calling it into question rather vociferously?

So I decided to talk to a source of mine who is in the know about most things nuclear. I asked him if indeed the supposition I had that Stuxnet would be pretty much useless in a Silo because of the way the systems were designed to be ultra redundant as well as segregated within that redundancy. What I got back was the following:

OK, at a high-level:

– The ~concept~ of a StuxNet and Nuclear Silos really only applies to operational readiness. With the exception of Pakistan no ~known~ nuclear player doesn’t already implement a variant of the PAL and CMS systems in their launch controls.

– The levels of redundancy involved for both the ability to launch, preventing launch, arming, and self-destruction at exist in nuclear silos is quite possible the most perfectly decision/failure tree designed/redesigned systems known to man. This wasn’t due to a one-time effort, its been decades in the making.

– The availability of the hardware, software, network access, peripherals access, etc. is SOOOO ridiculously limited that ~development~ of such a tool would be purely speculative. This isn’t SIPREnet or CRONOS or NAUTILUS we’re talking about here. The levels of control and network isolation, and again redundancy, within these installations at major players is appropriately absurd.

– In terms of ancillary systems and operational readiness there are two ways to look at it. Could something cause a scare a a general shutdown due to FUD? Yes. Could something be used for ~press~ purposes to indicate a lack of operational readiness. Yes. The reality is that those who would be deterred in a MAD scenario know better.

– We’re talking submarines too, a WHOLE different level of player and communication and control systems. The likes of which are even further unknown and more specific.

– W/ submarines there is a different sort of risk because some major players (namely the UK) don’t have the same level of controls on subs so a rogue commander w/ a key could start a launch. If talking StuxNet like situations, you’re not reducing their readiness so easily. It is know in these cases from various leaks that the control pathways are also isolated by design and ~MECHANICAL~ to what might even be considering a fault.

– If you’re a Nation-State that has been tutored in the ‘art’ by the US or USSR you’re also likely to have bizarre levels of controls like fan speed detectors, temperature detection, computational state metrics, etc. to show the slightest change in behavior. Some of this was designed around the idea of more traditional things like a Y2K bug maybe affecting ~some~ system. This that are, to any person who designs hardware, known to be fairly absurd and unnecessary but indeed they would trigger an alarm to ~look~ at something.

– All that said.. could a StuxNet like system affect the ~production~ and ~development~ of a nuclear weapon? Yes and no. Yes as in it certainly could screw up enrichment (obviously) but wouldn’t screw up the end-result (hence why StuxNet was found in the first place).

So, once again, I call shenanigans on Tomer and this little story. At worst, if there were a Stux variant that were worked out AND carried into a silo it would cause (maybe) a failure to launch, it is much more likely that Stuxnet and variants would instead be more used (as it was in Iran) to manipulate the production of fissile material so as to have a weapon that would not actually work once launched in the payload vehicle. This story though, and the way it has been put out there by Tomer Teller, makes it sound as though imminent failure could happen to nuclear bombs and this is just not right.

Even more ludicrous is the idea that a Stux variant could infect a system and cause the payload to come back from where it was launched, in effect changing the target coordinates. THIS would be more along the lines of just some malware, not Stuxnet that would infect specific systems in guidance on board the payload vehicle, and that is a totally different animal from Stuxnet. Indeed, this would be a completely different effort altogether and would require something else completely.

You see, the point of stuxnet was that it was manipulating PLC code to specific PLC’s Tomer, what you are talking about would be something completely different.

Go back to firewall evangelizing and leave the nuclear weapons alone.

K.