ibnu farxaan alkismaayawi: Jihadi Strategy of “Counter” Counter Terrorism
Links between “ibnu farxaan alkismaayawi” and alqimmah
I came across the following post in a Google search. The target was something else altogether, but the content caught my eye and I am now interested in this person, whoever he may be, that wrote this and other tutorials in April through May of this year. So far, the account is only to be found on alqimmah and only had about 90 posts before disappearing. What has me is that this guy is an American. The way that he writes pretty much clinches that for me down to the use of the colloquial word “flip” to describe an unworthy operative who would turn on his compatriots if caught.
“Ibnu” was pretty busy writing these treatises back in April and May. He covered a range of things from the ideologies between differing ideals of Jihad and Muslim thought, to tomes like this one espousing actual logistics surrounding the gathering of mujahideen, operational matters, and even how to weed out the weak or to use them for their purposes as judas goats. All in all, this guy had it going soup to nuts on all aspects of jihad… And that is what is bothering me. That and I am pretty sure this guy lives in the states somewhere.. Or did.
Overall, he is giving out orders so to speak, to re-form in the absence of Al Qaida with real workable tactical orders for those splinter cells out there. In short, if this guy were in charge of a cell or cells, I would worry more about an actually well carried out operation from such a cell… AND I think he is looking to take the job….
ibnu farxaan alkismaayawi
18th April 2010, 17:50
Bismillah, The following is developed for our brothers and sisters in resistance movements who are living in police states where suspicious activity is monitored heavily. It is not the nucleus of a short-term coup, but it is a structure designed to be a catalyst for long-term dramatic results. It might not resemble previous posts in this series, but a large part of counter terrorism deals with countering physical methods rather than simply propaganda. Without the physical aspect of a revolutionary movement, there is no revolutionary movement. Revolution breathes through the muzzle of a rifle. Our tongues and our pens are merely cartographers helping the movement to reach its destination. Prerequisites of a Physical Revolution:
1. A commander with a fiercely loyal advisory committee
2. Individual soldiers to grant the movement power
3. A clearly defined strategy which is pragmatic and aimed at achieving resultsRequirements for Maintaining the Organization: 1. Reliable funding
2. Secure meeting areas as well as hiding places that can be maintained for a long time
3. Means of communication
4. Means of transportation
5. Intelligence gathering capabilities
6. Arms and ammunition
7. Methods of moving money and supplies aroundMissions that Must Be Conducted By The Organization: 1. Intelligence must be gathered regarding key members of the oppressive regime, military capabilities, sympathies to the revolution from within the administration, and the intelligence agents of the oppressive regime.
2. Interrogation of the enemy to take their arms, learn about their plans, identify any moles, and to learn strengths and weaknesses of their organization and their members.
3. Identifying members whose abilities should be neutralized whether physically or strategically.
4. Inciting the public to take action against the regime. Spread negative propaganda of the regime, its policies, and its key members by utilizing conversations, pamphlets, websites and other forms of media.
5. Eliminate targets of economic, diplomatic, and emotional benefit to the enemy. Make its allies and partners distrust and dislike to deal with it.Requirements of the Members of the Organization: 1. Every single member must be Muslim with no exceptions and no leniency toward groups which are kuffar, but claim to be Muslim such as the extreme Shi’a and Sufis.
2. Every single member must be dedicated to the ideological struggle of the group, and cannot have disagreements on issues that could cause them to change their minds. Some of these issues are martyrdom operations, the kufr of the one who rules by other than what Allah has revealed, and important issues in ‘Aqeedah. This is not necessary in a movement that has control of large areas already like the Taliban
3. Members must be physically, mentally, spiritually, and emotionally mature. They cannot be prone to switching their views or breaking under pressure.
4. The person has to be willing to die for the cause. Members should be tested at some point in this by proposing they carry out a martyrdom operation in which they will almost certainly die. Based on their perceived reaction they should either be given a higher degree of trust or they should be relegated to menial roles and never be allowed to advance unless they demonstrate a severe change in attitude. Such a person is likely to flip.
5. The members must be disciplined and someone who demonstrates a lack of willingness to go along with plans as they are laid out should receive the same treatment as the one who is not willing to sacrifice.
6. Members who cannot keep secrets should be put into jobs where they do not have access to even knowing who their commanders are. They should be told to raise money by working regular jobs or running fake charities and only soldiers who are not in charge of anybody at all should be sent to them in order to collect the money. These people should be given false ideas about how important what they are doing is so that they do not feel compelled to ask why they are not given other roles.
7. Members must be free of severe debilitating illness. This is not to offend them, but such people are better suited to other things typically. This is concerning the physical aspect.
8. Members must be patient and stoic in nature. They should not fold under pressure, and they should be calm people who are not likely to suddenly change their opinions based on a dispute. He must be someone who is able to tolerate killing and the loss of his friends. He should not change his views or actions based on imprisonment, torture, or a disagreement with the orders he receives. If his brother turns out to be a spy, then he should not wince if he is ordered to kill him.
9. The person must be intelligent. There is no point in seeking after members with difficulty in comprehending complex matters until the movement gains enough traction to operate in the open.
10. Members must be cautious and they should not recklessly engage in dialogue with their enemies and other such things. They should not be arrogant people who think their enemies are not equally or more intelligent than they are. When they engage their enemies for manipulation they should already have figured out how to eliminate all possibility of a negative outcome.
11. Members must be truthful. Members who tell half-truths when they are found to have done something wrong or who have failed in something should be relegated to menial tasks.
12. Members should be able to utilize observation techniques. They should also be able to identify methods of concealment and infiltration that can get past enemy securities.
13. Members must become skilled in concealment, identity creation and theft, and in assuming new identities.
14. Members used in infiltrating the enemy’s organizations should either be recruited from their ranks or unidentified members of the revolution should be assigned to infiltrate the organization from the bottom up. Other opportunities may present themselves such as in the situation with Abu Dujaanah al-Khurasaani, raheemahullah.
15. Members should not be promoted until they have been in the organization for long periods of time and they have done things which no spy would be willing to do. For sensitive positions fake martyrdom operations should actually be conducted in which the recruit thinks he will be dying, but fake explosives are used in the operation. Methods should be used in order to make sure the soldier does not panic when he does not detonate, and the soldier should never know that he had a fake mission. Rather he should just think he was on a failed mission.
Subjects to Come: Funding, bases, potential organizational structure, communication, transportation, training
I have said it before and now I am showing you with posts from this guy, that the ranks are getting smarter and using more espionage techniques called “Tradecraft” in the business. More and more, the ranks seem to be getting converts or commanders who know the values of espionage and that their paradigm is changing in their “Jihad” This has been pointed out rather well with Al Malahem’s “Inspire” magazine issues thus far. In those they call for more lone wolves and small cells “in country” (i.e. in the US) who much work autonomously. Ibnu though, seems to be more of a through and through ex military type to me though and would be setting out the plans for all those cells to act as military units.
“IF” these doctrines were to be followed to the letter, then I should think that a concerted group would be more of a threat than the jihobbyists that we have been seeing lately. Thus far I think that Ibnu went to ground since April/May. Perhaps he changed user names… Either way, I will continue looking cuz this is one “kufaar” who isn’t just gonna lay down and let the likes of you and yours do me in.
Oh, and btw.. Nice try trying to hide this post.. I found it anyway.